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n May 1999, the United States had to
leave its military installations in Panama
due to the Carter-Torrijos agreement
that returned the Canal Zone to
Panama. As a result, the US Southern
Command (SouthCom) lost valuable assets
for its counter-narcotics operations in the
transit zone in the Caribbean and source
countries in the Andes. While most functions
could be moved to Florida and Puerto Rico,
the capacity for intelligence flights near the
major drug trafficking routes and production
centres was seriously hampered. 
The US started to look for existing airfields
to install so-called Forward Operating Locations
(FOLs), small-scale low-cost installations, to
facilitate the 2,000 anti-drug flights that
annually took off from Panama. Eventually
three FOLs were created in Manta (Ecuador),
Comalapa (El Salvador) and one using both
civilian airports on the Caribbean islands of
Aruba and Curaçao (part of The
Netherlands). All three countries conceded
the use of part of these airfields in ten-year
treaties. The outcomes of these US efforts to
ensure a ‘post-Panama presence in the region’
is reconstructed in this issue of Drugs &
Conflict.
The three FOL host countries justified their
decision by arguing that ‘we cannot deny an
allied nation co-operation in the field of drug
control’. The effectiveness of the anti-drugs
efforts carried out from the bases is in
question, however. The US General
Accounting Office (GAO), for example,
concluded that “adding military surveillance to the
nation’s interdiction efforts has not made a
difference in our ability to reduce the flow of cocaine
to American streets”. 
While the FOLs are presented as outposts
exclusively destined for anti-drugs operations,
there are serious concerns that the bases may
be used for more far reaching US foreign
policy goals, especially in relation to the
Colombian conflict. The US is heavily involved
with providing military assistance and
intelligence to the government in Bogotá in
their fight against the guerrilla. The conflict is
fuelled by drug revenues and US officials talk
about ‘narcoguerrilla’ or ‘narcoterrorists’, as
they have been dubbed after the attacks of
9\11. The distinction between counter-
insurgency and counter-narcotics operations
has become “so blurred as to be meaningless” as
the Washington Post once put it. 
During the Clinton Administration,
intelligence-sharing with Colombian security
forces was prohibited unless specifically
intended for drug control purposes. President
Bush reviewed the Clinton decision,
subsequently allowing the sharing of non-
drug related intelligence about guerrilla and
paramilitary activity, including tactical
information about movements and locations.
SouthCom now “plans to provide Colombia with
new levels of intelligence to assist its operations
against insurgent groups and to instruct their armed
forces in applying that information to operations,”
according to its director of operations
General Galen Jackman.
The asignment of the Joint Inter Agency Task
Force (JIATF) that involves anti-drugs
operations in the transit and source zone are
already being expanded to arms interdiction
and the monitoring and interception of ‘illegal
aliens’ coming from Latin America. US aid to
Colombia is being broadened to protection of
oil interests. A special Colombian unit has
been set up to protect the Caño Limón
pipeline, provided with US intelligence. The
US is also trying to get permission for flights
over Venezuelan territory in order to use the
corridor connecting Curaçao to the oil-rich
department of Arauca in Colombia where the
pipeline starts.
US law now allows the Colombian
government to use all past and present
counter-drug aid against the insurgents. The
legislation calls this “a unified campaign against
narcotics trafficking [and] against activities by
organizations designated as terrorist organizations”.
Till now the host nations have insisted on the
limited anti-drugs mission of the FOLs, but the
question is how long can they resist US
requests to broaden the scope of the
intelligence missions, presuming they can even
control whether or not current limitations are
respected. 
he relationship between drugs and
security has a long history in the
United States. In 1973 President
Richard Nixon declared illicit drugs
a threat to national security, and in 1989 the
government of President George Bush gave
the Department of Defense (DOD) prime
responsibility for monitoring and detecting
the transportation of illicit drugs in the hemi-
sphere. The United States’ National Drug
Control Strategy for 1998-2007 delegated to
the DOD, particularly the Southern Com-
mand (SouthCom) of the US armed forces,
operations related to the detection and mon-
itoring of the transportation of illicit drugs in
‘transit zones’ and programmes aimed at
interrupting the production and shipment of
drugs in ‘source zones.’
The May 1999 closure of the United States’
Howard Air Force Base in Panama, where
SouthCom operated, would affect the DOD’s
mission, forcing dramatic changes in its pres-
ence in Latin America and the Caribbean.
While some functions and installations could
be moved to Florida and Puerto Rico with-
out difficulty, mechanisms were needed to
enable military programmes to continue in
the region, especially those related to activ-
ities such as the training of troops under spe-
cial conditions, intelligence gathering, and
the detection and monitoring of the produc-
tion and transportation of illicit drugs, which
depended on direct contact with the transit
and source zones. Without the Howard Base
and with the failure of initial attempts to
ensure continuation of US military presence
in the region through the establishment of a
multilateral counter-drug centre in Panama,
the Forward Operating Locations (FOLs)
became a new, alternative model that would
substantially modify SouthCom’s theatre of
operations on the continent.
The concept was not entirely new. Since the
1980s, there have been air bases for the
interdiction of drug shipments. The novelty
in the FOL concept is that they are part of
an extensive network of strategic US loca-
tions in Latin America and the Caribbean.
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Comparison of coverage of Howard Air Force Base and FOLs
Source: GAO, Drug Control: International  Counter Drug. Sites being  develloped,
GAO-01-63BR,  December  2000
The locations make use of airports for air-
craft of various sizes, sophisticated intelli-
gence equipment, radar and satellite anten-
nae. In presenting the FOLs to the US Con-
gress, General Charles Wilhelm (SouthCom
commander-in-chief, September 1997 to Sep-
tember 2000) spoke of their economic advan-
tages over the earlier model, which covered
the FOLs’ tasks from Panama. The general
said that while Howard cost US$75.8 million
in its final year, the three air bases selected
thus far (Ecuador, Aruba and Curaçao)
required an investment of only US$122.5
million, and once in operation, the FOLs’
annual cost would not exceed US$18 mil-
lion.1 In addition, according to the DOD, the
three FOLs cover a larger geographic area
than the Howard Base did, offering broader
coverage of the production zone, and pene-
trating farther into the Eastern Pacific, where
traffic is increasing.2
Counter-drugs and military strategy
The DOD’s National Military Strategy (1997)
stated that the United States had an unprece-
dented opportunity to shape the future of
global security and proffered four strategic
concepts for doing this: “Strategic Agility, Over-
seas Presence, Power Projection and Decisive
Force.” While the primary consideration in the
development and use of force is combat (“the
Armed Forces’ core competence: we fight”3),
among the elements that the strategy con-
sidered to be of prime importance for putting
these strategic concepts into practice was
military action in peace time, “a particularly
important task of our forces overseas – those for-
ward stationed and those rotationally or tem-
porarily deployed.” To be able to conduct sev-
eral missions simultaneously, the armed
forces need inter-operability: “We remain com-
mitted to (...) technological development with our
key allies and to combined training events and exer-
cises that contribute to interoperability.” In addi-
tion, “It is imperative that our Joint Forces also
enhance their ability to operate in consonance with
other US government agencies.”4
Therefore, the military’s strategy required
greater inter-agency and international co-
operation in order to perfect, in peace time,
its ability to make war. Drug control activity,
because of its civilian connotation, is the
theatre of action that offered the DOD the
best conditions for expanding and deepening
both inter-agency bonds and mechanisms for
multilateral co-operation. In the words of
Brigadier General Galen Jackman (South-
Com) in September 2002, “One of the great
competencies that we have here in the South-
ern Command is our interagency coordination,
and we gained that competency because of the
drug war.” 5
The 1997 National Military Strategy also indi-
cated that the successful application of mili-
tary power depended on air and sea access:
“In addition our forces will normally require access
to US and overseas support infrastructure to main-
tain our ability to project power in times of crises.
Enroute infrastructure will assist our forces in
rapidly establishing and positioning themselves to
dominate any situation. (…) While the United
States will pursue the cooperation of other gov-
ernments to allow US forces access, it must not
assume that such cooperation will always be forth-
coming. A forced entry capability ensures that the
US will always be able to gain access to seaports,
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1 General Charles E. Wilhelm (SouthCom), Testimony before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, Wash-
ington DC, 21 September 1999. The figures would later be adjusted. The GAO cites DOD figures from July 2000
that place the cost of upgrading the four air bases at US$136.6 million and subsequent annual “operation and
maintenance” costs for the FOLs (once they are fully operational) at US$135.1 million (GAO, Drug Control: Interna-
tional Counterdrug Sites Being Developed, GAO-01-63BR, December 2000). It is understood that the annual costs pro-
vided by General Wilhelm in 1999 correspond only to the right to use and to operational services, although the
general calls them annual operating costs. 
2 GAO, GAO-01-63BR, 2000, Op. cit.
3 Shalikashvili, J. M., former head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Prologue to the US National Military Strategy, DOD, 1997. 
4 Ibidem.
5 Brigadier General Galen Jackman, chief of operations (US SouthCom J-3), at a press conference, 29 September
2002.
airfields, and other critical facilities that might oth-
erwise be denied (..) and gives the United States
the ability to go anywhere that US interests
require.”6
This view leaves little room for doubt. In
times of crisis (read, possible armed conflict)
and/or when US interests require, the FOLs
fit perfectly into the model of en route infra-
structure whose objective is to help ensure
that military forces have strategic agility, a
presence abroad, a projection of power and
the decisive use of force. In this regard, it is
worth remembering that two decades ago,
the United States emphatically denied that
the Palmerola airport in Honduras was being
used as a military base when it was known
to have functioned for years as a forward post
for US operations in Nicaragua and El Sal-
vador. Meanwhile, there is still the possibili-
ty in peace time of obtaining diplomatic clear-
ance for flights that do not fall within drug
control agreements. Because the FOL instal-
lations provide infrastructure accessible to
any type of aircraft, there could be a greater
temptation to use them for missions other
than anti-drugs operations.
FOLs and information superiority
Another area that directly involves the FOLs
and transcends the bounds of counter-drug
operations is the gathering of intelligence
data, including human intelligence (HUMINT),
signals intelligence (SIGINT or ELINT, in the
case of electronic data), images (IMINT) or
measurements (MASINT). The National Mil-
itary Strategy clearly stated, “Our Armed Forces
require the timely collection, evaluation, and assess-
ment of a full range of geo-political, socio-economic,
and military information throughout the full spec-
trum of conflict.” And the National Security
Strategy for a New Century (1999) stated
that “We are also committed to maintaining infor-
mation superiority – the capability to collect,
process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of
information while exploiting and/or denying an
adversary’s ability to do the same”.7 To maintain
this superiority, US agencies generally keep
most of their intelligence information to
themselves, away from the eyes of both ene-
mies and allies, while not limiting their gath-
ering of sensitive data and images to the
enemy camp.
One concern that arose during debate over
the bilateral agreements that established the
FOLs, especially in Ecuador and The Nether-
lands, was the possibility that information
gathered by the United States could be used
for purposes not exclusively related to drug
control activities. Was it realistic to assume
that intelligence data gathered in anti-drugs
efforts would not also become part of mili-
tary analysis and action in other areas, such
as counter-insurgency? During debate in the
Dutch Parliament over the FOL in Aruba and
Curaçao, this question became a decisive
factor. According to Jozias van Aartsen, who
was The Netherlands’ Foreign Minister at the
time, the government would not have accept-
ed the establishment of a FOL on its terri-
tory if one of its objectives had been to rein-
force Plan Colombia’s military component. In
the eyes of the Dutch government, “flights
from the FOLs are not for fighting the guerrillas.
The government of Colombia has other means for
doing that.”8 When Dutch opposition mem-
bers insisted on guarantees of faithful com-
pliance with this limitation on the use of the
Aruba-Curaçao FOL, Minister van Aartsen
responded that one should have trust in the
United States. 
This trust is not shared by independent
observers such as Loring Wirbel of the glob-
al network, Citizens for Peace, who says that
the FOLs “rely on portable intelligence platforms,
small airfields for unmanned aerial reconnaissance
vehicles and real-time links to the Space Warfare
Center at Schriever Air Force Base in Colorado
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6 DOD, National Military Strategy: Shape, Respond, Prepare Now – A Military Strategy for a New Era, 1997,
www.dtic.mil/jcs/core/nms.html.
7 The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, December 1999.
8 Tweede Kamer der Staten General, Verdragen in Voorbereiding. N. 39. Lijst van Vragen en Antwoorden, 25.530, The
Hague, December 8, 1999.
Springs, to provide a ‘virtual’ military base (...) since
the mid-1990’s, Schriever has moved towards
regional counterintelligence.” In addition, accord-
ing to Wirbel, the ‘Plan Colombia’ FOLs
served as the model for the installation of
small bases in countries neighbouring
Afghanistan.9
FOLs and expeditionary deployment
FOLs are not limited to the Western Hemi-
sphere nor to drug control activities. In fact,
the need to establish such sites has global
dimensions and is related
to strategic changes that
followed the Cold War.
During the Cold War, the
US Air Force operated
from fixed bases in the
United States and across
the globe. During the last
decade, not only Howard
in Panama, but many other
bases in other parts of the
world were closed, forcing
the Air Force to modify its operating mod-
els. It was then that the military began to
develop the concept of an Expeditionary Air
Force (EAF), dividing the Air Force into 10
rotating vectors – each “lighter, with a more spe-
cific orientation and more lethal than ever” – con-
stantly on the alert and able to attack ‘any-
where in the world within 24 to 48 hours’ if
a situation so required.10
The concept of the EAF as a “force with its main
base in the United States, but with a rotating expe-
ditionary deployment capability is based on the
FOLs, which routinely guarantee access and autho-
rization to operate. Denying the United States this
privilege at an important geopolitical point would
fundamentally undermine the strategy implicit in
the EAF. Put another way, access – including
enroute overflights, landing rights and diplomatic
authorization to operate from the FOLs – is a pre-
requisite for EAF operations.” 11
The combination of the EAF concept and the
establishment of the FOLs enables the Air
Force to “provide rapid aerospace capability,
according to need, and be ready to carry out mil-
itary operations related to all different aspects of
a conflict.”12 For the Iraq war, as for the war
in Afghanistan, several FOLs were estab-
lished in the Gulf
region in the course
of operations. In Latin
America, until recent-
ly, the only available
justification for estab-
lishing FOLs had been
the War on Drugs. By
now they can also be
presented as part of
the global War against
Terrorism. The FOLs
that have been established in the region have
sufficient operating capacity to support any
type of mission. The US Secretary of Defence
instructed the team responsible for rebuild-
ing the Manta air base to design and build “a
FOL capable of fully supporting or carrying out any
Southern Command mission.”13
Recent changes in military
architecture
Although even before the 11 September 2001
attacks, the administration of President
George W Bush had attempted to modify
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9 Wirbel, L., “Forward Operating Locations: Plan Colombia Experiment Moves to Afghanistan,” Peacework, Novem-
ber 2001.
10 Whitten Peters, F., Air Force secretary, and General Michael Ryan, chief of personnel, US Air Force, Air Expedi-
tionary Forces, DOD press conference, 4 August 1998.
11 Dowdy, W.L., PhD; military defence analyst, Expeditionary Diplomacy: POL-MIL Facilitation of AEF Deployments - ARI
Paper 2001-02, Airpower Research Institute, June 2001.
12 Lt. Col. Bryan A. Holt (US Air Force, Expeditionary Aerospace Force Center), “Commentary: The expedi-
tionary story, everyone’s responsibility,” Air Force News, 16 May 2001.
13 US Army Corps of Engineers, Application form, Delivery Team for the Manta FOL project; Calendar Year 2002 USACE
Project Delivery Team of the Year Awards, www.hq.usace.army.mil/pmbp/awards/sad/pdtmanta.doc 
“Denying the United
States this privilege at an
important geopolitical
point would
fundamentally
undermine the strategy”
certain aspects of the focus of the National
Security Strategy that had been drafted
between 1997 and 1999, the unilateral
approach to the “terrorist threat” meant
substantive change. Such a change implied
obvious consequences for the American con-
tinent, especially the Andean region, where
several of the insurgent groups on the State
Department’s list of terrorist organisations,
revised after 11 September 2001, operate.
According to the Center for International Policy
(CIP), “Even before September 11, 2001, the new
Bush Administration had initiated a ‘review process’
to explore the possibility of going beyond the drug
war to help Colombia’s government fight the guer-
rillas and the paramilitaries.”14 The current US
Security Strategy, published in September
2002, also highlights the need for “new
approaches to warfare, strengthening joint opera-
tions, exploiting U.S. intelligence advantages,”
defining this as “our first line of defense against
terrorists and the threat posed by hostile states,”
and proposing “the proper fusion of information
between intelligence and law enforcement”
because an all-source analysis system will be
needed.15
Changes in US military support for
Colombia
While the aforementioned changes have
become more radical and obvious with the
younger Bush’s presidency, there were
already substantial modifications in counter-
drug activity in the hemisphere during the
Clinton administration. Quoting the Center for
International Policy again, until about 1999
“Colombia’s National Police received nearly all
lethal U.S. aid. Washington was wary of getting too
deeply involved in the country’s conflict (...). The
Clinton Administration nonetheless shifted the bulk
of aid to the military in 1999 and 2000.” Since
March 1999, US agencies have been sharing
intelligence “in real time” with the Colombian
armed forces, though they were limited by a
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-73) at
the time that only permitted such activity
within the framework of counter-drug activ-
ity, albeit without a guarantee of compliance
with this restriction.16 Even then, it was
increasingly evident that the United States
was blurring the conceptual difference
between the War on Drugs and counter-
insurgency. In a conversation with the Wash-
ington Times in February 2002, some DOD
officials called PDD-73 “very frustrating”.17
That year marked the beginning of efforts by
Bush to change Clinton’s Presidential Deci-
sion Directive.
On 2 August 2002, a legal provision regard-
ing anti-terrorist emergency funds (HR 4775)
allowed “the Colombian government to use all
past and present counter-drug aid – all the heli-
copters, weapons, brigades and other initiatives of
the past several years – against the insurgents.”
In this context, CIP also mentions a possible
renegotiation of the FOL agreements, which
currently prohibit the use of intelligence gath-
ered from the sites for purposes other than
counter-drug efforts.18 There are indications
that from the start for the United States the
use of the FOLs may not have been limited
to counter-drug activities. In June 1999, the
Colombian newspaper El Espectador quoted
a US State Department source as saying,
“The new counterdrug bases located in Ecuador,
Aruba and Curaçao will be strategic points for close-
ly monitoring the guerrillas’ steps and their constant
incursions into Venezuela, Panama, Brazil, Peru and
Ecuador.” One State Department document to
which El Espectador had access revealed the
tactic used: “So as not to divert the missions,
which will initially focus on counterdrug efforts, and
in order to avoid polemics in the international arena
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14 CIP, International Policy Report: The ‘War on Drugs’ meets the ‘War on Terrorism’: The United States’ involvement in Colom-
bia climbs to the next level. Washington DC, February 2003.
15 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002.
16 GAO, Drug Control: Narcotics Threat From Colombia Continues to Grow, US General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-
99-136, June 1999.
17 “U.S. Law Bars Giving Colombians Data,” The Washington Times, 26 February 2002.
18 CIP, 2003, Op. cit.
and Congress, military intelligence work against the
FARC and the ELN will mainly be framed in rela-
tion to their status as ‘narcoguerrillas.’”19
In September 1999, General Wilhelm told
Congress that “the key to peace in Colombia is
to cut off the insurgents’ income from drug traf-
ficking”.20 General McCaffrey, the Drug Czar
at the time, agreed with this view: “if we catch
a plane with drugs in the Caribbean, the guerril-
las will have received their payback”.21 For Gen-
eral Peter Pace (SouthCom commander-in
chief, September 2000 to August 2002),
Colombia was “key to the region’s stability,” and
therefore SouthCom “needs greater redun-
dancy in ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, Recon-
naissance] assets to mitigate risk during crisis.
Specifically, we need addition-
al airborne quick-reaction ISR
capability.”22 When one of
these planes, a De Haviland
RC-7 Airborne Reconnais-
sance Low (ARL), crashed
in Colombia in July 1999
while on a routine counter-
drug patrol, the magazine
Newsweek quoted a “source
knowledgeable about the
mission” who said, “We’re
not supposed to be monitoring
guerrillas, but that’s what they
were doing”.23
With the change of the law
in August 2002, these practices became legal.
In early 2003, Jane’s Defence Weekly, a maga-
zine specialising in military affairs, mentioned
“plans to provide Colombia with new levels of intel-
ligence to assist its operations against insurgent
groups.”24
Regional security and anti-terrorism
Five days after the adoption of HR 4775, the
new president of Colombia, Alvaro Uribe,
took office. Within a week, he had declared
a state of emergency. This gave the security
forces legal powers that included controlling
movement and limiting access in certain
areas, censoring the press and suspending
democratically elected representatives who
“contribute to public turmoil”.25 While Uribe lost
no time in reinforcing his military offensive
against the insurgents with counter-drug
equipment recently provided by the United
States, on the international front the new
president, along with State Department offi-
cials, lobbied for a greater commitment from
neighbouring coun-
tries to safeguarding
“regional security.”
One of the first steps
in this area was to
have Colombia’s in-
surgent groups for-
mally declared ter-
rorists. Although
these diplomatic
efforts encountered
“differences of focus
and concept” in Brazil,
Venezuela and, to a
certain extent, Ecua-
dor,26 there has been
evident progress, in
Washington’s view, with regard to joint bor-
der monitoring, the creation of new military
bases on the borders (16 in Ecuador and 13
in Brazil, including both police and the armed
forces), sharing of information and other
areas.
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19 “La agenda secreta para Colombia,” El Espectador, Bogotá, 4 June 1999.
20 “Paz necesita victoria en el campo de batalla: Wilhelm,” El Tiempo, Bogotá, 22 September 1999 (quoting General
Wilhelm’s testimony before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control. Washington DC, 21 September
1999). 
21 “US Trains Colombia Force to Fight Rebels’ Drugs Profits,” The New York Times, 28 July 1999.
22 General Peter Pace (SouthCom), Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington DC, 27 March
2001; and Testimony before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, Washington DC, 28 February 2001. 
23 “Fighting the Rebels: A Mysterious Plane Crash Highlights Covert US Operations,” Newsweek, 9 August 1999.
24 “US Special Forces Give Colombians Anti-Terrorism Training,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, London, 8 January 2003.
25 The Washington Post, 13 August 2002.
26 Project Counselling Service, Informe de Fronteras, Bogotá, February 2003.
“The new counterdrug
bases located in Ecuador,
Aruba and Curaçao will
be strategic points for
closely monitoring the
guerrillas’ steps and
their constant incursions
into Venezuela, Panama,
Brazil, Peru and
Ecuador.” 
According to various observers, the US Spe-
cial Forces in the Peruvian Amazon, on that
country’s border with Colombia, are engaged
in exercises designed to capture top FARC
leaders.27 In January 2002, the Ecuadoran
Congress’ International Relations Commis-
sion stated that insecurity on the country’s
northern border was grounds for reviewing
the terms of the agreement for the use of the
FOL in Manta.28 Less than two years earlier,
Ecuador’s national defence minister, Gener-
al José Gallardo, had written in a confiden-
tial memo about the Colombian conflict, “It
is not advisable to grant more facilities than those
that currently exist for aerial operations against
drug trafficking from the Manta base.”29 Never-
theless, in his first visit to Washington as
president-elect of Ecuador, in February 2003,
Former Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez expressed
his desire to turn his country into the Unit-
ed States’ best ally in the fight against drug
trafficking and terrorism. In March, Presi-
dent Gutiérrez turned over control of Cus-
toms to the country’s armed forces and the
Ecuadoran Naval Air Corps moved from
Guayaquil to Manta as part of efforts to unify
naval air operations that established Manta as
“the new axis of security for the northern border.”30
Throwing petroleum on the fire
It is clear that the military part of new US
counter-drug investment in the region, first
within the framework of Plan Colombia
(2000-2001), and since 2002 as the Andean
Regional Initiative (ARI), was not limited to
the fight against drugs, neither in form nor in
practice. In order to understand the impact
that this strategy will have in the region in the
near future, one specific issue merits further
examination: military protection for energy
resources vital to the United States.
On 13 February 2003, the US Congress
approved the 2003 Foreign Aid Bill, which
included “the first significant non-drug military aid
to Colombia since the Cold War: $98 million to help
the Colombian Army protect the 480-mile [770
kms] long Caño Limón-Coveñas oil pipeline.” For
fiscal year 2004, the Bush administration has
included “an undetermined amount, up to $147
million (...) in order to continue the program.”31
The pipeline is jointly owned by Ecopetrol (a
state-run Colombian company, 50%), Occi-
dental Petroleum (US, 44%) and Repsol-YPF
(Spain, 6%). The protection programme
began with training and equipment for as
many as 800 Colombian solders who, with US
assistance, are to protect the easternmost
120 kilometers of the pipeline. According to
Anne Patterson, US ambassador to Colom-
bia, these installations are among 338 “criti-
cal ‘infrastructure points’ in Colombia of concern
to United States”.32 In 2001, the Colombian
government lost about US$500 million (2%
of the national budget) and Occidental Petro-
leum lost US$50 million because of constant
attacks on the pipeline by insurgents in Arau-
ca. Between 1996 and 2000, Occidental spent
nearly US$8.7 million on contacts with US
officials about policy toward Latin America,
particularly Colombia. Although the compa-
ny denies having asked the government for
protection for its installations in Colombia,
the new military programme could be con-
sidered partly a result of these contacts.
Eventually, it is expected that 7,000 elite
troops will be trained.33
In 1998, General Wilhelm pointed out that
new oil exploration increased Colombia’s
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27 Project Counselling Service, Informe de Fronteras, Bogotá, March 2003. The first public mention of this plan was
in Narconews (www.narconews.com), 25 October 2002.
28 La Hora, Quito, 16 January 2002
29 General José Gallardo Román, National Defence Minister, Apreciación global estratégica del conflicto que sufre Colom-
bia y sus efectos sobre Ecuador, Quito, 2000 (no date).
30 Project Counseling Service, February 2003, Op. cit.
31 WOLA, Colombia Monitor: Protecting the Pipeline: The U.S. Military Mission Expands, Washington DC, May 2003.
32 Ibidem.
33 Forero, J., “New Role for U.S. in Colombia: Protecting a Vital Oil Pipeline,” The New York Times, 4 October 2002.
Cited by WOLA, 2003, Op. cit.
“strategic importance” for the United States.34
In 1999, after Hugo Chávez was sworn in as
president of Venezuela, Wilhelm noted that
the country represented 18% of the United
States’ energy imports.35 Between 1996 and
2000, oil exports to the United States from
Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador together
were equal, on average, to the amount from
all the Persian Gulf states combined, while
projections of Colombia’s potential reserves
have raised expectations
that the country, which is
not a member of OPEC
(the Organisation of
Petroleum Exporting
Countries), could, in the
words of one Ecopetrol
analyst, “help the United
States put pressure on the
market in times of limited
supply.”36
Ecuador also enters into the equation. In the
northern part of the country, a consortium
of multinational companies based in the Unit-
ed States, Spain, Canada, Italy and Argentina
has backed Occidental Petroleum’s con-
struction of the Heavy Crude Pipeline
(known locally as the OCP, for its Spanish ini-
tials), which is expected to double Ecuador’s
capacity for oil production and transporta-
tion. In that country, too, the line between
national security affairs and the protection of
private interests has become blurred. In
August 2001, the trade magazine Energy Com-
pass noted that Petroecuador and 16 private
companies operating in Ecuador “arranged a
deal under which they can pay the military for pro-
tection.”37 The military build-up on the north-
ern border, therefore, is not gratuitous.
In February 1998, before FOL negotiations
began, an Air Force official made a series of
recommendations that now appear to have
been prescient. Referring to the increasing
importance of South
American petroleum,
he said that if “military
attention follows this shift
in vital interest […] for-
ward basing will be found
woefully lacking.” Region-
al commands “must be
proactive immediately in
the establishment of new
bases”. The “selection and
development of four or five
central bases with at least minimal infrastructure
is the first step to ensuring forward access.” The
same official emphasised that it is better to
negotiate contracts with host nations before
a crisis strikes, “anticipating the need for access
and beginning dialogue without time constraints.
Laying the political groundwork and obtaining ini-
tial approval is the first half of the process. (…) In
times of crisis, the Armed Forces can further
improve possibilities for access by helping to ‘sell’
the idea of a threat in the host nation” with the
goal of gaining approval for expanded use of
the site.38
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34 Ibidem.
35 General Charles Wilhelm (SouthCom), Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on
Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, Narcotics Affairs and Terrorism, Washington DC, 22 June 1999. 
36 WOLA, 2003, Op. cit., with data from the AER Database: www.tonto.eia.coe.gov/aer/aer-toc-d2000cfm, and Crude Oil
Imports From Ecuador (Non-OPEC); Mb/d.: www.economagic.com/emcgi/data.exe/doeme/coimpen.
37 “Ecuadorean producers to pay military for protection,” Energy Compass, 10 August 2001. Quoted by WOLA,
2003, Op. cit.
38 Major Tom Goffus (US Air Force), Air Expeditionary Forces: Forward Base Access, unclassified document, Naval War
College, Newport, 13 February 1998
“In times of crisis, the
Armed Forces can further
improve possibilities for
access by helping to ‘sell’
the idea of a threat in the
host nation” 
TN
I
F O L s  w i t h i n  d r u g s  a n d  s e c u r i t y  s t r a t e g i e s
12 D r u g s  a n d  C o n f l i c t  n o  8  -  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 3
The 1989 decision to make the Department of
Defense (DOD) the lead agency for detecting and
monitoring air and maritime shipments of illegal
drugs led to a dramatic increase in the number of
military assets and personnel dedicated to the
counter-drug effort. According to the General
Accounting Office (GAO), “Funding for DOD’s sur-
veillance mission and its associated flying hours
and steaming days has increased from about $212
million in fiscal year 1989 to an estimated $844
million in fiscal year 1993 - nearly a 300-percent
increase.”1 The period can be seen as the ‘honey-
moon’ period of DOD and the counter-drug mis-
sion. In its heyday about half of all AWACS flying
hours were dedicated to drug interdiction mis-
sions. “The timing for large-scale military involve-
ment was excellent: the Cold War was drawing to a
close, freeing up large amounts of assets, but the dra-
matic drawdown had not yet begun.”2
The honeymoon was short. In the course of 1993,
GAO undertook a thorough review which led to
devastating conclusions. “Measured against inter-
diction success rates and supply reduction goals, the
investment in the flying hours and steaming days
that support DOD’s mission is out of proportion to
the benefits it provides.” According to the report,
interdiction success at deterring the cocaine flow
has been more symbolic than real. “The hope that
military surveillance would make a difference has
proven to be overly optimistic.”3 The GAO made an
explicit recommendation to Congress that “in light
of the negligible contribution that military survei-
llance has made to the drug war”, DOD’s involve-
ment in interdiction “should be significantly redu-
ced.”4
The Clinton Administration had taken office that
year, in 1993, and “determined that a controlled shift
in emphasis was required—a shift away from past
efforts that focused primarily on interdiction in the
transit zones to new efforts that focus on interdic-
tion in and around source countries,”5 a conclusion
that was formalised in Presidential Directive 14
later that year.6 Subsequent years saw a decline in
counter-drug funding for DOD of some 24%
between 1993 and 1999. DOD flight hours allocat-
ed to tracking illegal drug shipments in transit
areas declined from about 46.000 in 1992 to some
15.000 in 1999, a 68% drop. All combined flights
(DOD, Customs and Coast Guard) dropped from
over 60.000 to below 40.000. The number of DOD
ship days declined from about 4,800 to 1,800, or
62%, over the same period.7 US SouthCom chief
General Wilhelm reported that by 1999 DOD was
unable to grant the majority of their requests for
anti-drug flights: “we requested slightly in excess of
900 aerial sorties (..). Our fill was less than 400”.8
DOD & Drugs: The Honeymoon
1 GAO, Drug Control - Heavy Investment in Military Surveillance Not Paying Off; US General Account-
ing Office, GAO/NSIAD-93-220, September 1993.
2 Major Kimberly J. Corcoran, DOD Involvement in the Counterdrug Effort – Contributions and Limi-
tations, Air Command and Staff College, AU/ACSC/0077/97-03, March 1997 [the author is an Air
Force pilot flying AWACS missions between 1994-96].
3 GAO, GAO/NSIAD-93-220, 1993, op. cit.
4 Ibidem. 
5 The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, February 1995.
6 The White House, Presidential Decision Directive for Counternarcotics (PDD-14), 3 November 1993.
7 GAO, Assets DOD Contributes to Reducing the Illegal Drug Supply Have Declined, US General
Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-00-9, December 1999.
8 General Charles Wilhelm (US SouthCom), Testimony before the Senate Caucus on International Nar-
cotics Control, Washington DC, 21 September 1999.
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A completed drug interdiction normally consists of six phases, some of which may occur simulta-
neously. 
1 Provision of intelligence information to drug interdiction agencies indicating that a drug smug-
gling activity is planned or underway. 
2 Initial detection of a potential smuggling aircraft or vessel. 
3 Monitoring, which consists of tracking a target aircraft or vessel (maintaining information on its
position, course and speed) and moving to intercept it.
4 Identifying the target and distinguishing drug smuggling traffic from legitimate traffic. 
5 Hand-over, or shifting of primary responsibility between forces, such as from DOD to the Coast
Guard. 
6 Apprehending (detaining, arresting, or seizing) suspects, drugs or vehicles or causing the suspects
to jettison their drugs or to turn back from their mission.
Official sources mention the following aircraft in relation to the FOLs:
large aircrafts:
 US Air Force E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), equipped with a rotating
radar dome with a range of more than 250 miles. The E-3 can fly for more than 8 hours without
refuelling and is used in air, ground and sea detection, control and communication operations. 
medium aircrafts:
 US Navy E-2C Hawkeye (Grumman Aerospace) AWACS, also equipped with a rotating radar, can
fly for 6 hours without refuelling and virtually perform the same tasks as E-3 aircrafts.
 US Navy and US Customs Service P-3 Orion, used for air and sea surveillance and detection. It can
fly for more than 11 hours without refuelling.
 C-130 Hercules (Lockheed Martin), used for troops (up to 128 people) and material transport. 
small aircrafts:
 F-15 Eagle (McDonnell Douglas), used for verification (through radar and display) and interdic-
tion (tracker aircraft).
 F-16 Falcon (Lockheed Martin), used to perform the same activities.
 Citation 550 (Cessna), tracker used by the Customs authorities.
There are three kinds of ground-based radars in the region (see Map):
 Three Relocatable Over-The-Horizon Radars (ROTHRs) operating in Texas, Virginia (since 1994-
95), and Puerto Rico (since 2000), respectively, with a range of 3218 kms though with limitations
regarding the precision and the detection of low-flying objects.
 Ground Mobile Radars (GMRs), managed by US Southern Command in locations in the Caribbe-
an (Caribbean Basin Radar Network), amongst others in Riohacha and San Andrés; in Colombia
(Leticia, Marandúa, San Juan de Guaviare, Tres Esquinas, and possibly in Araracuara and Taba-
tinga); in Peru (Iquitos, Andoas and Pucallpa); and probably in Ecuador (in Sucumbíos or Napo).
Some observers report the operation of a total of 17 GMRs, which usually have a range of 386 kms.
 A series of ground-based radars managed by authorities in the region and generating information
that is, to a higher or lower degree, shared with authorities from other countries. The best known
system is SIVAM (Brazil), a set of 25 radars nearly completely installed (April 2003), generating infor-
mation that the United States and Colombia especially wish to further access. 
The phases and equipment of interdiction
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The Amazon Surveillance System
SIVAM (Sistema de Vigilância da
Amazônia) is a project of the
Brazilian Government to monitor
and protect the Amazon Basin
against deforestation, inappropri-
ate land use and illegal gold min-
ing, as well as drug production
and trafficking. The system con-
sists of a sattelite and ground-
based and airborne radar and sur-
veillance platforms that cover the
whole Amazon Basin. Although
approved in 1998, Brazil still has
not implemented a shoot-down
policy for illicit drug flights. Unlike
ground-based radar in Peru,
Bolivia, Ecuador and Colombia
which are operated primarily by
US military personnel, SIVAM is
run exclusively by Brazilians. On
this map only the border ground-
based radars are shown, which
reach extends into the neigh-
bouring countries.
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* This map does not pretend to be complete 
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fter it became obvious that US
conversations with Panama
over continued use of the
Howard Base as a multilateral
counter-drug centre had failed,
the US government made efforts to seek
“alternative arrangements with other governments
interested in carrying out (counter-drug) activities
in the future.”1 These “arrangements” began in
1998.2 The first official mention came in July
1998, when James Rubin of the State Depart-
ment stated that “possible posts include Hon-
duras, Ecuador or a site in the United States, pos-
sibly Florida.”3 According to the US General
Accounting Office (GAO), in September of
that year the DOD drew up the basic crite-
ria for site selection: 1) proximity to source
and transit zones; 2) protection of US per-
sonnel and equipment; and 3) sufficient infra-
structure to minimise construction costs.4 A
presentation by the US Southern Command
in October broadened the range of options
to Aruba and Curaçao, Belize, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, Guatemala, Panama, Peru and
Trinidad. At that time, a combination of three
locations, one each in South America, Cen-
tral America and the Caribbean, was already
being proposed. By the time the Howard
Base finally closed, provisional agreements
had already been signed establishing access to
new sites in Ecuador and Aruba-Curaçao. On
31 March 2000, eleven months after Howard
closed and following the breakdown of nego-
tiations with Costa Rica, the United States
and El Salvador signed a 10-year agreement
for the installation of the Central American
site near the Salvadoran capital.
Once the backing of the FOL host country
governments was obtained, SouthCom’s con-
cern became US congressional approval of
the funds needed to upgrade the airports.
Design and construction costs were initially
included in the budget for supporting Plan
Colombia, which approved in July 2000 a
total of US$1.3 billion.5
With clear differences in each of the host
countries, the debate and criticism that pre-
ceded the signing of the various FOL agree-
ments influenced the content of the accords
that were finally signed. Although the three
agreements are clearly based on a single
model document, there are marked differ-
ences which indicate that certain govern-
ments had better positions or greater nego-
tiating capacity than others. Although these
differences are not decisive for the overall
operations of the FOLs, they demonstrate
the margins for negotiation that were used
by the different governments to defend their
own interests in the face of US demands.
While debate over the FOL agreements con-
tinued, the posts began to operate on a tem-
porary basis. In comparison to the 2,500
troops that SouthCom had proposed sta-
tioning in the derailed multilateral centre in
Panama,6 the FOLs seemed minor: between
10 and 15 permanent staff members and,
“under normal circumstances”, a maximum of
300 (Ecuador and Curaçao) and 100 (Aruba
and El Salvador) additional personnel on a
rotating basis.7
1 Rubin, J. (State Department), “U.S. Blames Panama For Deadlock on Drugs Base,” Reuters, 20 July 1998.
2 In December 1998, the Netherlands Antilles Justice Minister, Rutsel Martha, said that initial conversations had
been held in June with the United States about establishing a FOL in Curaçao. It was later said that the first over-
tures had been made in October of that year (Amigoe, Willemstad, 12 December 1998; 12 January 2002).
3 “U.S., Panama to Abandon Canal Anti-Drug Center,” Reuters, 20 July 1998.
4 GAO, Drug Control: International Counterdrug Sites Being Developed, US General Accounting Office, GAO-01-63BR,
December 2000.
5 The funds initially approved only included US$116.5 million for the FOLs in Ecuador and Aruba-Curaçao. See:
General Peter Pace, commander in chief of SouthCom, Testimony before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics
Control, Washington DC, 28 February 2001.
6 Romero, P. (State Department), Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight, Washington DC, 4 May 1999.
7 General Charles Wilhelm (SouthCom), Testimony before the Senate Approprations Committee, Defense Subcommittee
and the Military Construction Committee, Washington DC, 14 July 1999; Van Aartsen, J. (Dutch Minister of Foreign
Affairs), DWH/AK-99/00, The Hague, 18 July 1999; Patterson, A., Letter to the Legislative Assembly of El Salvador, 5
July 2000. The agreement with Ecuador allows for a maximum of 475 troops in special situations.
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Initially, the construction of additional instal-
lations for housing these staff was only
planned for Manta, Ecuador, although the
construction of infrastructure for operations
and training was planned for all the FOLs. The
main airport upgrades involved their capaci-
ty to receive, station and maintain aircraft.
Manta and Hato Rey (Curaçao) have been
adapted for all types of aircraft, including the
largest models,8 while plans for Aruba and El
Salvador only included ‘medium-size’ and
‘small’ aircraft.
In mid-March 2001, the Manta air base was
closed to upgrade the runway, lengthening it
to 3,100 meters and building new communi-
cations towers and a taxiway to a new area
for parking aircraft. After the first phase of
the work was finished, Fernando Arroyo, a
US Army engineer, said that Manta had “one
of the best runways in South America”.9 In
Curaçao, maximum efforts were made to
share installations with the Dutch Navy. In
Aruba, the first evaluation of the FOL agree-
ment between The Netherlands and the Unit-
ed States refers to an operational difficulty
caused by the lack of space for parking air-
craft. Construction of a new area was includ-
ed in plans presented by SouthCom.10 In an
adjustment to the national budget after 11
September 2001, however, the US Congress
indefinitely postponed this funding. In 2003,
operations from the Aruba site were almost
completely suspended. As in Aruba, changes
planned for the airport in Comalapa (El Sal-
vador) have been reduced to the construc-
tion of a new tarmac area and access. The
work is to be finished by the end of 2003.
US personnel operating from the FOLs
The tasks of oversight, monitoring, identifi-
cation and interception in transit zones are
shared by DOD, Coast Guard and Customs
personnel. The DOD is the co-ordinating
agency for these activities. The Coast Guard
is responsible for intercepting seagoing ves-
sels, in collaboration with Customs. In pro-
duction zones, local authorities are respon-
sible for the detention of persons and seizure
of drugs.
The agreements and operational annexes
signed by the respective governments estab-
lish maximum limits for personnel from those
agencies who can be present in the FOLs at
any given time, though there is a fair amount
of latitude in these figures. According to
General René Vargas Pazzos, retired head of
the Ecuadoran Army, the FOL is only
required to provide information about per-
sonnel staying for longer than seven days at
the Manta base: “The North Americans can
have as many troops as they want. Those who fall
under the requirements of the reports cannot
exceed 450, but there is no control over the oth-
ers, who stay for fewer than seven days.” The gen-
eral referred to the FOL operating agreement
for Manta as a “war plan.”11 According to
retired Ecuadoran Air Force officers, the
capacity of the Manta runway and facilities
would allow between 15,000 and 16,000
troops to pass through in a single week. The
agreement does not limit the number of peo-
ple who can use the FOL at any given time
while in transit to another destination.
Besides the airports, the agreements include
the use of seaports in the host countries.
During 2002, 15 US warships were reported
to have arrived in the port at Manta.
While the DOD has concentrated on greater
professionalism among its combat troops,
the United States has also increased the del-
egation of support tasks to private contrac-
tors, a system known as ‘outsourcing’. Dur-
ing 2002, the DOD and the State Depart-
8 One example of a “large plane” mentioned is the E-3 Sentry (AWACS) “spy” plane; nevertheless, the huge C-5
transport plane (which is 75 meters long, with a 68-meter wingspan) can also take off fully loaded from the run-
ways at Manta and Hato Rey (www.af.mil/factsheets).
9 La Hora, Quito, 14 December 2001.
10 GAO, GAO-01-63BR, 2000, Op. cit.
11 APDHE, Base de EE.UU.  en Manta y Plan Colombia: análisis de impactos y alternativas para el Ecuador, forum orga-
nized by: APDH, Consultative Commission of the Monitoring Group for the Impacts of Plan Colombia in Ecuador
and the Parliamentary Sub-commission to Evaluate Plan Colombia, Quito, May 2001.
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ment contracted 17 and three private com-
panies, respectively, for various duties. The
company most involved in the FOLs is Dyn-
Corp Aerospace Technology. Its participation
in anti-drugs operations in the Andean Region
through State Department contracts dates
back to 1991 and mainly involves aircraft
maintenance and training for national pilots,
not operational activities.12 In The Nether-
lands and Ecuador, however, there is a great
deal of sensitivity on this subject. The work
of DynCorp, and of this type of company in
general, is not subject to oversight, and
employees of the company have been impli-
cated in several scandals.13 DynCorp has
also been contracted to do aerial spraying of
coca and opium poppy fields in Colombia. 
Information sharing and overflights
The sharing with host country authorities of
information gathered from the FOLs is an
issue plagued by contradictions. What is clear
is that the US is keeping some of the infor-
mation strictly confidential. At both Manta
and Hato Rey, there are areas that are off lim-
its to all local personnel. It is practically
impossible to determine whether the FOLs
are being used to gather information for pur-
poses other than combating drugs. US law
also limits how much information US civilian
and military personnel can share with author-
ities of other countries. This also has to do
with the risks of aerial interception which
have become clear after the 2001 shooting
down by Peruvian military of a missionary
plane wrongly identified as a drug trafficking
flight on the basis of information provided by
a company working for the CIA. In such
cases the US government might be sued for
compensation by the victims’ families.14 Nev-
ertheless, the renewal of the aerial interdic-
tion programmes, recently restarted  in
Colombia and expected in the near future in
Peru, will also mark a return to the sharing
of information for this purpose.
According to the GAO, another obstacle to
FOL operations is the fact that some gov-
ernments in the region (including Cuba, the
Dominican Republic and Venezuela) do not
want to allow the United States free access
to their air space. The case of Venezuela is
one of the most notorious because of the
strong position toward the United States
taken by the Hugo Chávez administration,
especially after allegations of possible US
involvement in a coup attempt on 12 April
2002. According to the magazine Intel Brief-
ing, “patrol aircraft operating from the (…) FOL
in Manta, Ecuador, also provided intelligence on the
military revolt against Chávez.”15 The Venezue-
lan government has since changed its posi-
tion, however, accepting a new request by the
United States for an air corridor passing
over Venezuela en route from Curaçao to the
Colombian region of Arauca, where the Caño
Limón-Coveñas pipeline begins and where US
Special Forces personnel were recently
deployed to support Colombian troops.
The possible use of the FOLs to support the
coup in Venezuela is one example of how
SouthCom’s actions in the region are not lim-
ited to counter-drug operations. The arrival
of a large number of US military vessels on
the Ecuadoran coast has led to an unforeseen
use of the Manta FOL. In early 2002, a pro-
gramme began that uses satellite data to pur-
sue boats carrying Ecuadoran migrants
toward the United States. By June of that
year, seven boats carrying 1,545 people had
been intercepted in international waters and
their passengers repatriated to Ecuador.16
12 Amigoe, Willemstad, 28 February 2000.
13 El Comercio, Quito, 29 April 2002.
14 The Washington Post, November 4, 1999. 
15 Intel Briefing, 13 April 2002.
16 Project Counselling Service, Border Report, Bogotá, June 2003.
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Among the obstacles in the negotiations
with Panama over the possible use of the
Howard Base for the Multilateral Counter-
drug Center (MCC), two stand out: the 12-
year minimum time frame sought by the
United States and its desire to include
access to the country for military training,
regional logistics, search and rescue activi-
ties, and related missions. The State
Department referred to the need for an
“effective presence in relation to costs” that
“could not be reconciled with Panama’s poli-
tical requirements.”1 After the publication
of the interim agreement on the MCC bet-
ween the United States and Panama in
January 1998, Pérez Balladares faced strong
opposition to the plan. In March, the State
Department suspended the negotiations,
partly because of Panama’s condition that
MCC operations be limited to counter-drug
missions.2
In Costa Rica, while confidential prelimi-
nary negotiations were underway for the
installation of a FOL in Liberia, strong cri-
ticism arose over the Cooperation Agree-
ment on Suppression of Illicit Trafficking
ratified by the Legislative Assembly in Sep-
tember 1999 with one clear restriction: per-
mission to use the country’s airspace and
order suspicious planes to land referred
strictly to US aircraft belonging to police,
and not to military craft. This restriction
was a direct consequence of the historical
sensitivity of Costa Rica’s governments and
citizens to the issue of military activity.
Such sensitivity did not have the same
results in other cases. In Ecuador and El Sal-
vador, representatives of civil society and
an opposition political party filed formal
legal cases, charging that the agreements
were unconstitutional. In both cases, sim-
ilar arguments were used and strong criti-
cism was made about national territory
being used by the United States for military
purposes and the inequitable distribution
of rights and obligations in the agreements
signed. The Salvadoran opposition raised
the constitutional requirement that such
agreements must be approved by a two-
thirds vote in the parliament. In both coun-
tries, the courts rejected the cases. 
The relationship between the FOLs and the
Colombian conflict has been one of the
reasons for resistance to the agreements in
all the countries, but only in The Nether-
lands was this concern reflected in political
measures. Opponents of the treaty warned
that because they were part of the US bud-
get for Plan Colombia, the FOLs were tur-
ning The Netherlands into an indirect pla-
yer in a conflict in which human rights vio-
lations are daily fare. During the debate in
the lower house of Parliament, the minister
repeatedly stated that the FOLs can only be
used for drug control missions and that his
US colleague had given his word on this. A
clause establishing an annual review of “the
operation of the FOLs in a broad sense” hel-
ped overcome the lack of Parliamentary
support for the Treaty. Nevertheless, the
foreign minister rejected the declassifica-
tion of essential data about the flights,
which would have enabled the parliament
to do real follow-up and have an oversight
of the missions carried out from the FOLs.
Opposition to FOL agreements in the host countries
1 Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Affairs and Law
Enforcement, Testimony before the House of Representatives, Washington DC, 9 June
2000.
2 This was how Peter Romero (State Department) put it in his Testimony before the
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources of the Commit-
tee on Government Reform and Oversight, Washington DC, 4 May 1999.
Conclusion
The United States takes advantage of two
basic tools of coercion to address what it
considers threats to its national security: its
capacity to wage war and its information
superiority. The FOLs, and counter-drug
activities in general, aid in this effort. Con-
trary to what General Wilhelm told the US
Congress when he defined the FOLs as the
result of “agreements between the governments
of the United States and the host countries, by
which the United States
obtains access to existing
installations that are the prop-
erty of and continue to be
managed by the host coun-
try,”17 in practice the FOLs
operate under the com-
mand of a US ‘administra-
tor’, co-ordinating with
the local commander
responsible for the host
country installations. It is the US administra-
tor, however, who directs FOL operations
and the resulting information in situ. There are
no mechanisms which would enable the host
country or other observers to verify whether
the use of the FOLs is truly limited to
counter-drug operations.
The annual evaluation of the FOL in Aruba
and Curaçao, which The Netherlands’ par-
liament established as part of the agreement,
does not provide for this either. At the time,
the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs refused
to provide details about flight plans, claiming
it was confidential information that would
affect the effectiveness of interdiction oper-
ations if it were made public. Another expla-
nation could be that the Dutch government
simply does not have access to this informa-
tion and the minister was trying to cover for
this.
It is very likely that the agencies that use the
FOLs have other priorities besides combat-
ing drugs. Although in theory the FOLs
should fall within multilateral co-operation
efforts, it was the
United States that
took the initiative to
establish them, defin-
ing their use accord-
ing to its own inter-
ests. Counter-insur-
gency efforts in
Colombia, control of
arms trafficking in the
region, control of
migration and possible support for the coup
in Venezuela are indications of other uses of
the FOLs that are not laid down in the agree-
ments. Nor should the possible implications
be underestimated of military protection -
whether official or contracted - for the petro-
leum interests of transnational companies
operating in the region. The FOLs unques-
tionably form part of a US military strategy
towards Latin America and the Caribbean.
The host countries share with the United
States, therefore, certain responsibility for
the implications of this project.
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17 General Charles Wilhelm (SouthCom), Testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Defense Subcommittee
and the Military Construction Subcommittee, Washington DC, 14 July 1999.
There are no mechanisms
to verify whether the use
of the FOLs is truly
limited to counter-drug
operations.
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Clinton’s Presidential Decision Directive 14
ordered a review of the nation’s command, con-
trol and intelligence centres involved in interna-
tional counter-narcotics operations, resulting in
the establishment in 1994 of three Joint Intera-
gency Task Forces (JIATFs). JIATF-West, based in
Alameda, California, falls under US Pacific Com-
mand, and focuses on disrupting the trafficking
of heroin and other drugs originating in South
Asia, and assists JIATF-East to disrupt maritime
smuggling of cocaine along the Eastern Pacific to
Mexico.  JIATF-East (for the Caribbean/Central
American transit zone) came to be based in Key
West, Florida. In Key West, the Joint Southern
Surveillance and Reconnaissance Operations Cen-
ter (JSSROC) already functioned, originally set up
to monitor military build-up in Cuba. The centre,
which mission nowadays includes a supportive
role in counter-drug operations, collects and
processes all military intelligence from air mis-
sions, radar systems, satellites and communica-
tion intercepts. JIATF-South (for the South Amer-
ican source zone) operated from the Howard Air
Force base in Panama, but moved to Florida and
merged with JIATF-East when the Panama base
was closed down in May 1999. 
The FOLs operate under this merged JIATF in
Florida, placed under the command of US South-
ern Command. The Task Force co-ordinates the
employment of ships and aircraft of US Customs,
the Coast Guard, the Navy and the Air Force and
from allied nations with a military presence in the
Caribbean, namely France, Great Britain and The
Netherlands. The Task Force is also meant to knot
together drug intelligence flows from law enforce-
ment and intelligence agencies such as the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA); Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Defense Intelli-
gence Agency (DIA); Naval Criminal Investigative
Service; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and
the National Security Agency (NSA). Since the
merger, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador,
Peru and Venezuela have assigned liaison officers
to JIATF. Improving co-ordination and intelli-
gence-sharing between all the agencies and
countries involved was meant to enhance the
cost effectiveness of the combined surveillance
capacity. 
The merged JIATF also plays a major role in
source zone interdiction, aimed at disrupting
drug trafficking within the Andean-Amazon
region. These Air Bridge Denial operations were
suspended in the region after the 2001 shooting
down of an aircraft in Peru carrying Baptist mis-
sionary Veronica Bowers and her 7 month old
daughter Charity. Both were killed in the accident
after private AirScan contractors working for the
CIA mistakenly suspected the aircraft of drug
smuggling. In April 2003, a new agreement was
reached with Colombia to resume Air Bridge
Denial operations, after a careful review of pro-
cedures to prevent such dramatic mistakes in the
future. To avoid liability risks, the guidelines for
JIATF attached to the agreement, stress that “U.S.
personnel will not (repeat – “not”) be a participant
in any decision to launch against or shoot down
aircraft – as this is solely a Commander of the
Colombian Air Force’s decision.”1 After a series of
test runs, operations in Colombia started again in
August 2003, which is expected to significantly
increase the number of flights from the FOLs in
Manta and Aruba/Curacao. It has been
announced that Air Bridge Denial operations in
Peru might re-start at the end of the year.
JIATF – Inter-agency cooperation
1 JIATF, Air Bridge Denial Operations, Director Joint Interagency Task Force South, Naval Air Facil-
ity, Key West Florida, 30 April 2003.
“An effective, balanced drug policy
requires an aggressive interdiction
program to make drugs scarce,
expensive, and of unreliable quality”,
according to the latest White
House drug control strategy.1 By employing
the military, the government wanted to dra-
matically increase the interdiction capability.
Ever since, this decision has been questioned,
not least by government agencies and armed
forces insiders. Question marks surround
the effectiveness of the interdiction strategy
in general as well as the added value of bring-
ing in the military. The political justification
for the FOLs and the reason Ecuador, The
Netherlands and El Salvador agreed to host
them is built on very questionable assump-
tions about the usefulness of the FOLs for
stemming the flow of drugs.
Measuring effectiveness
The effectiveness of interdiction operations
is often measured in terms of quantities of
drugs seized. As an US Air Force observer
said, however, “’Tons of drugs seized’ are as false
a metric for the ‘drug war’ as ‘body count’ was for
the ‘Vietnam War’.”2 The GAO in 1993 had
already questioned the real impact of seizures
regarding the availability of illicit drugs on the
US market: “Some federal officials contend that
interdiction at least reduces cocaine availability in
the United States by the amounts seized. Howev-
er, we know of no evidence to prove that theory,
which apparently is based on an assumption that
all available cocaine is already being shipped to the
United States. [..] A different theory, which seems
more consistent with supply and demand princi-
ples and estimates, is that the South American car-
tels ship to the United States whatever amounts
their customers demand, with interdiction losses
merely replaced by later shipments.”3
According to a military analyst sympathetic
to a continued DOD role in the fight against
drugs: “Oversight agencies as well as the DOD
continue to look for the means to measure the
effectiveness of military assistance with respect to
interdiction. There are none. The only truly assess-
able MOE [measure of effectiveness] is the price
and availability of illegal drugs within the U.S. which
is currently a function of demand vice supply.”4
Here is where, again and again, reviews fail
to observe any progress. “Despite long-stand-
ing efforts and expenditures of billions of dollars,
illegal drugs still flood the United States. Although
U.S. and host-nation counternarcotics efforts have
resulted in the arrest of major drug traffickers and
the seizure of large amounts of drugs, they have
not materially reduced the availability of drugs in
the United States.”5
Impacts on the market
A research institute in the US interviewed
scores of imprisoned drug traffickers, in the
context of an ONDCP-sponsored investiga-
tion into the effectiveness of interdiction
operations. “Unless there is an informant involved,
your odds are 95 percent in your favour” is the
general assessment. “Most traffickers perceived
government interdiction and investigative operations
as manageable risks – ones that could be overcome
by altering their routes and methods and being
careful in selecting their associates. Ten percent of
the smugglers stated that Customs aircrafts P-3s
and aerostat balloons where a definite deterrent.
In the case of P-3s, they would wait them out and
they also found ways to thwart the aerostats by ter-
rain masking techniques or simply waiting until one
was down.” The researchers concluded that
“smugglers don’t feel much of a threat on the water
because law enforcement is unable to spot them.
If spotted, they feel law enforcement can’t catch
them, and if caught, the use of sophisticated com-
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1 The White House, National Drug Control Policy, Washington DC, February 2003.
2 Lieutenant Colonel Stephen P.Howard (United States Air Force), The Military War on Drugs: Too Many Assets, Too
Few Results, Air University, April 2001.
3 GAO, Drug Control - Heavy Investment in Military Surveillance Not Paying Off; US General Accounting Office,
GAO/NSIAD-93-220, September 1993.
4 Lieutenant Commander Stephen B. Dietz III, U.S. Navy, Sticking with the ‘Drug War’ – A viable and feasible course of
action, Naval War College, Newport, 13 June 1997.
5 GAO, Observations on U.S. Counternarcotics Activities, Statement of Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Assistant Comptroller Gen-
eral, National Security and International Affairs Division, GAO/T-NSIAD-98-249, 16 September 1998.
partments makes it virtually impossible for the
drugs to be located.”6
The study probably represents the most
sophisticated attempt thus far to calculate the
impact of interdiction on price/purity trends
in the US and on trafficking patterns. Apart
from the smugglers’ own assessment, the
study develops a detailed model to analyse
market trends, identify statistically significant
fluctuations and compare those with inter-
diction operations going on at the time. On
the basis of their model, the researchers are
able to show the impacts on the market
caused by enforcement interventions. In all
cases, however, these are shown to be tem-
porary dents that have not influenced the
longer term trend. The effects are compara-
ble to the impact of periods of intensive hur-
ricanes, such as when El Niño caused hurri-
canes almost every day for three months in
the spring of 1997 making any sea or air
transport in the transit zone virtually impos-
sible, and affecting price and purity of cocaine
on the US market. 
Changing patterns
According to the researchers, the shift away
from clandestine flights as a means of inter-
national smuggling, which occurred in the
transit zone in the early 1990s and between
Peru and Colombia during the mid-1990s,
“suggests that operations were effective enough to
force smugglers to change their transportation
routes and/or methods. However, as the counter-
drug community has long recognized, drug traf-
fickers’ ability to get drugs from South America into
the U.S. is limited only by their creativity.”7
This major shift casts further doubts about
the usefulness of FOL-type surveillance and
monitoring. The classical image of private
cocaine smuggling aircraft that can be picked
up on radar and forced or shot down by fight-
er jets, for which the military surveillance and
monitoring system was originally designed,
have become exceptions to the rule – at least
in the transit zone. Nowadays, shipments
are primarily brought in via containerised
cargo, coastal freighters and fishing vessels,
all means of smuggling for which ground-
based radars, AWACS, P-3s or F-16s are of
little use. Go-fast private boats still play a sig-
nificant role in the initial stage, bringing the
cargo to a Caribbean island to enter com-
mercial vessels or to a coast in Central Amer-
ica or Mexico, from where most of the cargo
enters the US by trucks.8 Interdiction of
drugs hiding within these immense commer-
cial transport flows has become more depen-
dent on intelligence, informers and border
checks, and less on detecting ‘suspected air-
craft’.
In the end, the protagonists of surveillance
and monitoring-based interdiction strategies
are left with a very meagre justification: “pre-
vious ‘failures’ do not preclude future successes”,
and the lack of ability to measure any effec-
tiveness “is not a justifiable reason to reward the
drug traffickers with an additional degree of free-
dom to conduct criminal activity”.9
A new élan
Such doubts did not escape the attention of
the White House. The latest National Drug
Control Strategy (February 2003) mentions
that “it is an article of faith among many self-styled
drug policy “experts” that drug interdiction is
futile”. The Bush administration is trying to
regain confidence in the strategy. “The drug
trade is not an unstoppable force of nature but
rather a profit-making enterprise where costs and
rewards exist in an equilibrium that can be dis-
rupted. Every action that makes the drug trade
more costly and less profitable is a step toward
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6 ONDCP, Measuring the Deterrent Effect of Enforcement Operations on Drug Smuggling, 1991-1999, Prepared for: Office
of National Drug Control Policy, Prepared by: Abt Associates, Inc., NCJ 189988, August 2001.
7 Ibidem.
8 US Department of Justice, National Drug Threat Assessment 2003, National Drug Intelligence Center, Washington
DC, Product No. 2003-Q0317-001, January 2003.
9 Lieutenant Commander Stephen B. Dietz III, 2001, Op. cit.
“breaking” the market. [..] current interdiction
rates are within reach of the 35 to 50 percent
seizure rate that is estimated would prompt a col-
lapse of profitability for smugglers”.
Two recent developments are creating a
sense of euphoria, a renewed confidence
that all the efforts are finally paying off: the
decline of coca cultivation in Colombia and
the sustained decline since 1998 of cocaine
purity. Drug Czar John Walters in July this
year talked about a recession in the cocaine
trade for the first time in 25 years and said
that “we expect to see in the next 6 to 9 months
significant disruptions in the purity and availabili-
ty of cocaine throughout the world.”10
The reduction in hectares under coca culti-
vation in Colombia as a result of intensive
spraying is confirmed by the UNODC Illicit
Crop Monitoring Programme.11 US officials
talk about a ‘breaking point’. Though con-
cerned about indications of expansion of
coca cultivation in the rest of the Andean
region, John Walters maintains: “I don’t believe
that the magnitude of the changes in Peru or
Bolivia, or those that we project for the next year,
are conceivably capable of offsetting the destruc-
tion of the base of the business of cocaine in Colom-
bia. [..] the shock that is being applied by the tempo
in Colombia is beyond what we believe is any legit-
imate estimate of the capacity of the market to cor-
respond and buffer with replanting or other ways
of avoiding it.”12
Declining purity 
DEA samples of export quality cocaine show
a reduction in purity from 86% in 1996-98 to
78% in 2001. This declining purity also trans-
lates to lower stages of wholesale and retail
distribution in the US. Since Colombian
cocaine production was still on the rise dur-
ing this period, this cannot be attributed to
the more recent decline in coca production.
Different possible explanations are given. 
The most detailed attempt is undertaken by
a steering committee chaired by the DEA in
which all involved US agencies sit together to
assess the availability of illegal drugs on the
US market. The Working Group on Cocaine
is led by the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA). The 2002 report points to two rele-
vant factors. Firstly, that “over one half of all
cocaine bricks leaving source zone labs are now
being cut with diluents. At the end of 2000, about
a third of all samples were diluted, which at that
time was a significant increase from previous
years.” “We assess that the fundamental cause for
decreased cocaine purity is that Andean cocaine
supplies have failed to keep up with expanding
international demand. As a result of competition
for limited supplies, traffickers have been motivated
to “stretch” their product and/or maximize prof-
its by adding diluents at cocaine HCl labs. [..] Con-
sumption has increased most notably in South
America and Europe. In 1990, global consumption
was probably around 500 metric tons, of which the
United States consumed about 400 metric tons.
By 2001, global consumption had increased to
more than 600 metric tons, while U.S. consump-
tion had dropped to about 260 metric tons.”13
The other factor additional to the deliberate
cutting is that “chemical analysis of samples
revealed that illicit cocaine laboratories in Colom-
bia are using significantly reduced amounts of the
required essential solvents for processing, often
skipping the use of one of the two key solvents in
the final step of cocaine HCl processing.” The
most likely reason behind this is the strength-
ened international effort, Operation Purple,
to restrict the trade in potassium perman-
ganate. Increased difficulty in obtaining this
essential precursor forced traffickers to
export cocaine “without the benefit of the total
package of traditional purifying solvents.”
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10 Walters, J., Current Developments in Colombia in the Fight Against Drug Trafficking And Narcoterrorism, Foreign Press
Center, State Department, Washington DC, 29 July 2003.
11 UNODC, Colombia Coca Survey for 2002, Preliminary Report, UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna, March
2003.
12 Walters, J., 2003, Op. cit.
13 Drug Availability Steering Committee, Drug Availability Estimates in the United States, NCJ 197107, December 2002.
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Their prediction is that “cocaine purities will
probably continue to fall marginally overtime as
eradication and interdiction prevent supply from
matching demand.” With regard to the
counter-strategy for traffickers, “the most
viable strategy for them will be to make every effort
to increase the global coca supply.”14
The National Drug Threat Assessment 2003,
prepared under the responsibility of the US
Justice Department, does not air any élan of
renewed confidence and is quite careful in its
assessment and predictions. “Powder cocaine
is readily available throughout the country, and
availability appears to be stable overall—rising
slightly in some areas and declining slightly in oth-
ers. [..] DEA reports that cocaine prices through-
out the country were low and stable in 2001.”
They concur with the analysis that as cocaine
consumption markets expand in Latin Amer-
ica and in Europe the average purity of whole-
sale cocaine is likely to remain lower than
mid-1990s levels. Depending on develop-
ments in Colombia, however, “the potential for
production levels to increase in Peru and Bolivia may
offset the increased demand brought on by mar-
ket expansion, allowing purity levels to stabilize.”15
Conclusion
There is not yet much reason for drug con-
trol agencies to be optimistic about a strate-
gic breakthrough. The renewed confidence in
the War on Drugs at the political level is
based on market fluctuations that can, at
best, be regarded as tactical successes. Sim-
ilar fluctuations have occurred before and can
still level out over the next few years. More-
over, whatever the exact reasons behind the
purity decline, they have little to do with the
type of interdiction operations carried out
from the FOLs. The conclusion reached by
the GAO in 1993 still seems valid, that “mil-
itary surveillance has not demonstrated that it can
make a contribution—to either drug interdiction or
to the national goal of reduced drug supplies—that
is commensurate with its cost. [..] adding military
surveillance to the nation’s interdiction efforts has
not made a difference in our ability to reduce the
flow of cocaine to American streets.”16
After dedicating fifteen years of his military
career to counter-narcotics efforts, flying
AWACS missions, serving as a JIATF station
officer and acting as radar station chief, US
Air Force Major Daniel L. Whitten has not
become convinced of its usefulness. “During
the past two decades the administrations in power
have continued to escalate the military’s involve-
ment in this fight. [..] Interdiction has been the pri-
mary military application for more than 15 years.
And after all this time we have not had a serious
impact on the drug market if price and availabili-
ty are an indicator. That stability in price is a pro-
found indicator of our ineffectiveness in drying up
drug supplies. [..] In my opinion the military inter-
diction effort is an extremely expensive and inef-
fective mission for our forces to perform.”17
A military colleague of Major Whitten at the
Air University arrives at the same conclusion.
“These operations met none of the goals or objec-
tives outlined in the policies that called for these
military endeavors. Interdiction operations aimed
at the illegal drug supply achieve nothing of con-
sequence.” The author, an Air Force officer
who took time off to study the effects of
interdiction, started from a fully supportive
position but after six months concluded:
“Further militarization of the drug war is not the
answer. [..] It’s time to take the responsibility for
America’s drug war from the hands of the military
generals and give it to the Surgeon General.”18
14 Ibidem.
15 US Department of Justice, 2003, Op. cit.
16 GAO, Expanded Military Surveillance Not Justified by Measurable Goals or Results, Statement of Louis J. Rodrigues,
Director, Systems Development and Production Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division,
GAO/T-NSIAD-94-14, 5 October 1993.
17 Major Daniel L.Whitten (US Air Force), Perspective on the Military Involvement in the War on Drugs – Is there a better
way?, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, Air University, AU/ACSC/227/1999-04, April 1999.
18 Lieutenant Colonel Stephen P.Howard, 2001, Op. cit.
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Seizure percentages for cocaine have grown to
impressive levels. Roughly between a quarter to
one third of all cocaine produced is probably
being seized throughout the world each year.
Estimates vary greatly from source to source. 
For the year 2001, the calculation of the combined
US agencies in the ‘Drug Availability Estimates in
the United States’ (December 2002) was that a
total of 290 metric tons was seized worldwide.
This would amount to 26% of  the 1178 mt total
production estimated by the US for 2001. For the
same year, the UN calculation published in the
‘Global Illicit Drug Trends 2003’ was that a total
of 366 mt had been seized, representing no less
than 44% of the much lower UN estimate of a
total production of 827 mt. 
The US seizure data bank appears to be incom-
plete regarding seizures by non-US agencies. The
UN data bank, based on country reporting, on the
other hand, seems rather inflated due to double
countings. A seizure in international waters off
the Mexican coast, for example, is easily claimed
by both the US and Mexico if agencies from both
countries were involved in the operation. In both
calculations, the cited percentages of global
cocaine supply intercepted should be lowered as
weights have not been adjusted for purity differ-
ences. A portion of the seizures is done further
down the distribution chain, where purity levels
are way below the average purity of export qual-
ity cocaine. Despite the considerable margins of
error, the estimates do support the conclusion
that in the case of cocaine, interdiction rates
have surpassed the figure traditionally cited in
press reports that only ‘10% of drugs is inter-
cepted’. The large amounts seized over the past
decade do, however, seem to have been largely
offset by increased production in the Andes. High
seizure rates do not yet mean there is less cocaine
available for consumption on the market. 
Without detailed operational flight data, it is
impossible to establish whether a specific seizu-
re is the result of actions undertaken from one of
the FOLs. A few specific examples have been high-
lighted, however, to illustrate the usefulness of the
FOLs. In July 2001, the US ambassador to El Sal-
vador congratulated the country for “the biggest
maritime drug seizure in US history”. On May 15,
a shipment of 13 metric tons of cocaine was inter-
cepted in an operation supported by a P-3 aircraft
from the Comalapa FOL.1 A similar mega-seizu-
re of 12.8 metric tons was made on 11 February
2002, on the coast of Ecuador, with monitoring
support from a P-3 aircraft operating from the
Manta FOL. On May 25 that same year, another P-
3 helped to detain a go-fast boat in the Caribbe-
an carrying 900 kilograms of cocaine. And on 3
July 2002, the radar at Comalapa apparently detec-
ted a shipment of 1.93 metric tons of cocaine.
There are not sufficient systematised data publicly
available to assess the tactical contribution of the
FOLs to the overall interdiction effort.
In the first annual evaluation, the Dutch Minister
of Foreign Affairs indicates: “Also thanks to aerial
surveillance undertaken from the FOLs, a contri-
bution was made to interdicting the trade flow and
seizing over 30 tons of cocaine and 7 tons of
marihuana.” These figures, however, represent
total amounts intercepted in the area, not just
those apprehended with support from the FOLs,
hence the words ‘also’ and ‘contribution’ in the
quote. The evaluation specifies that between
October 2001 and September 2002, 424 flights
were undertaken from Curacao and Aruba, with
a total of 1,386 hours and concludes that these
“flights have made a significant contribution to
the international fight against organized drug
crime.”2 The first year the FOL was operational,
between May 1999 and April 2000, 531 flights
were reported - 229 from Aruba and 302 from
Curacao. During this period, a total of 35 ship-
ments were intercepted in the Caribbean region,
roughly 20 tons of cocaine and 10 tons of
marihuana. Out of the total intercepted ship-
ments, only two - representing 3 tons of drugs -
“were the direct result of activities undertaken
from the FOLs on Aruba and Curacao”.3
Seizure rates
1 Rose Likins, US Ambassador to El Salvador and Anne Patterson, US Ambassador to Colombia, during
a televised press conference, San Salvador, 19 July 2001.
2 Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. J.G. de Hoop Scheffer, Evaluatie Verdrag met de VS inzake Forward Ope-
rating Locations, DWH/AK-02/1672, The Hague, December 2002.
3 Minister of Foreign Affairs J. Van Aartsen, Vestiging van Forward Operating Locations op de Nederlandse
Antillen en Aruba, Letter to Parliament, DWH/AK-99/0018, The Hague, July 2000.
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This issue of Drugs & Conflict explains the
background to and operation of the US Forward
Operating Locations (FOLs) in Ecuador, El
Salvador and Aruba/Curaçao, established since
1999. While FOLs have been set up in many parts
of the world, most recently around Afghanistan
and in the Gulf Region, the only available
justification, until recently, for establishing these
US-commanded airbases in Latin America had
been the War on Drugs. The host countries
agreed to the establishment of the FOLs to
facilitate military surveillance for the purpose of
interdicting drug shipments. There is no evidence
that the FOLs have made any discernible difference
to the flow of illicit drugs to the USA, however,
as even US military sources and the US General
Accounting Office publicly acknowledge.
There is little question that the FOLs form part
of a US military strategy towards Latin America
and the Caribbean. The FOLs came into being with
the closure of the Howard Air Force Base in
Panama in 1999 from which the US Southern
Command had operated. The US Department of
Defence had to come up with an alternative means
of assuring operational capacity in the region.
There is evidence that the FOLs are being used
for a number of purposes, besides the ostensible
role in counter-narcotics efforts. This includes
gathering intelligence on arms trafficking in the
region and migrant boats destined for the USA.
Serious concerns have arisen about the possible
use of the FOLs in support of US military
involvement in the Colombian conflict. The war
on drugs has been explicitly incorporated into the
“global war on terrorism”. Though the host
countries have insisted on the limited anti-drugs
mission of the FOLs, the mission has gradually
shifted to support what is now called a “unified
campaign” against drugs and terrorism.
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Founded in 1974, TNI is an inter-
national network of activist-
scholars committed to critical
analyses of the global problems
of today and tomorrow. It aims
to provide intellectual support
to those movements concerned
to steer the world in a democ-
ratic, equitable and environ-
mentally sustainable direction.
Since 1996, the TNI Drugs &
Democracy programme has
been analysing trends in the ille-
gal drugs economy and in drug
policies globally, their causes and
their effects on economy, peace
and democracy. 
The Drugs & Democracy pro-
gramme conducts field investi-
gations, engages policy debates,
briefs journalists and officials,
coordinates international cam-
paigns and conferences, pro-
duces articles, publications and
briefing documents, and main-
tains a daily electronic news ser-
vice on drugs-related issues. 
The aim of the project and of
the Drugs and Conflict series is
to stimulate a re-assessment of
conventional prohibitive and
repressive policy approaches and
to argue for policies based on
principles consistent with a com-
mitment to harm reduction, fair
trade, development, democra-
cy, human rights, environmental
and health protection, and con-
flict prevention. 
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